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ARTICLE
THE INEVITABILITY OF UNIVERSAL
BANKING
Jonathan R. Macey*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "universal banking" means different things to dif-
ferent people. But at bottom, everyone agrees that universal
banking means expanded powers for banks.
In most discussions of universal banking, Germany typically
is cited as the archetypal example of a universal banking regime.
In Germany, corporations with banking licenses cannot only
take deposits and make loans, but they also are permitted to
underwrite and trade securities, to operate mutual funds, to en-
gage in investment counseling, and even to hold large equity
shares in commercial, industrial, and insurance companies if
these activities are kept within different departments of the
bank.1 In general, the critical difference between German-style
universal banking and British-style merchant banking is that it
is relatively rare for British banking firms to combine with com-
mercial enterprises, while this is quite common in the German
system. In addition, British banks tend to have corporate struc-
tures that organize business activities into separate legal subsidi-
aries, while in Germany all of the various business activities gen-
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erally are conducted within the bank itself.2
Given the high failure rate of banks in the United States, it
is now obvious why the United States government should give
our banks expanded powers such as those given to German
banks. Financial institutions are engaging in an expanded range
of activities, including at least some activities that traditionally
have been characterized as "commercial" activities or "invest-
ment banking" activities. This Article seeks to explain why the
United States should permit bank powers to expand into univer-
sal banking by showing that: (1) the differences between the
business of commercial banking and the business of dealing in
securities are more a product of regulatory artifact than eco-
nomic reality; (2) the functional differences between banking
and commerce have been greatly overstated; (3) the common
perception that securities activities are more closely related to
banking than are commercial activities is erroneous; and, (4)
technology has eroded regulatory barriers to such an extent that
universal banking is already a reality in the United States.
For universal banking to become a legal reality in the
United States, at a bare minimum, three regulatory changes
must take place. First, the federal government must remove the
legal restrictions on bank involvement in securities activities.
Second, federal agencies must permit banks to invest in and
control businesses that engage in activities that are not related
to the financial services industry. And finally, both the federal
government and state legislatures must remove existing barriers
to interstate expansion.
II. COMPARISONS
A. The Separation of the Banking Business and the Securities
Business
In the United States, the need to separate the business of
commercial banking from the business of investment banking
has been a cornerstone of the regulatory culture since the 1930s.
Indeed, "the perceived need to separate banking and investment
banking was even more firmly entrenched among regulators than
the need to separate banking and commerce, due to the wide-
spread belief that the securities affiliates of the nation's com-
2. Id. at 6-8. Insurance and real estate activities generally are conducted through
bank subsidiaries, however.
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mercial banks were responsible for the Great Depression."3
The separation between the banking and securities busi-
nesses is a curious one. Both sorts of enterprises serve as sources
of financing for borrowers. Banks traditionally make financing
available by making loans. Securities firms traditionally make fi-
nancing available by selling securities on behalf of customers.
Borrowers, of course, like other consumers, care only about
price. For borrowers, the cost of borrowing is the net interest
cost, including transaction costs and tax considerations. Borrow-
ers are indifferent about whether the money they rent comes in
the form of a securities offering or in the form of a bank loan.
Thus, from the customer's perspective, it is difficult to describe
the difference between investment banking and commercial
banking.
One way to distinguish between investment banking and
commercial banking is to focus on the differences in the
processes by which commercial banks and investment banks
provide funding to clients. Traditionally, when investment bank-
ers provide such funding, they raise the funds from third parties
through the sale of investment vehicles, like stocks or bonds. By
contrast, the usual mechanism through which banks provide
funding for third parties is the commercial loan, which involves
a direct extension of credit by the bank to the borrower. Thus,
investment banks are financial intermediaries who bring inves-
tors and borrowers together, while commercial banks tradition-
ally have made direct investments of their own capital to supply
funding for borrowers.
Unfortunately, this distinction with regard to capital forma-
tion places commercial banks at a profound- competitive disad-
vantage to investment banks. For example, commercial banks
need more capital to fund their lending operations than invest-
ment banks need to fund their investment banking operations.
As regulatory agencies have increased both capital requirements
and the severity of penalties for being "undercapitalized, '4 the
cost of making traditional commercial bank loans has increased
as well. Commercial banks also are at a competitive disadvan-
3. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANIUNG LAW AND REGULATION 491
(1992) [hereinafter MACEY & MILLER]; see also S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1993); 75 CONG. REC. 9887 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass).
4. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified throughout 12 U.S.C.); see infra notes 29, 35-36, 46
& 50.
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tage because investment banks move assets off of their books at
a much faster rate than commercial banks, which traditionally
have kept loans on their balance sheets as assets until they
reached maturity. Thus, commercial banks have greater expo-
sure to both credit risk and interest-rate risk than investment
banks. Because commercial banks must be compensated for this
additional risk if they are to remain in business, the cost of ob-
taining financing through commercial lending is generally higher
than the cost of obtaining financing by selling securities.
Technological change is another important factor that has
placed investment banks in a competitively advantageous posi-
tion with respect to commercial banks. Advances in technology
have decreased the cost of providing funding for business
through issuing securities relative to the costs of providing funds
through commercial lending. As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, observed:
Developments in computer and communications technology
have reduced the economic role of commercial banks and en-
hanced the function of investment banking. These permanent
and fundamental changes in the environment for conducting
financial business cannot be halted by statutory prohibitions,
and the longer the law refuses to recognize that fundamental
and permanent changes have occurred, the less relevant it will
be as a force for stability and competitive fairness in our finan-
cial markets. Attempts to hold the present structure in place
will be defeated through the inevitable loopholes that innova-
tion forced by competitive necessity will develop, although
there will be heavy costs in terms of competitive fairness and
respect for law that are so critical to a safe and sound financial
system.5
The most important effect of changes in technology has
been the facilitation of securitization. Securitization involves the
packaging of assets, such as loans, into bundles that are then
sold in the form of securities. To the extent that assets can be
securitized, the demand for banks' traditional lending activities
necessarily decreases because borrowers are able to choose
whether to fund their activities through commercial loans from
banks or through the issuance of securities. For many borrowers,
5. Alan Greenspan, Statement to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs (Dec. 1, 1987), in 74 FED. RES. BULL. 91 (1988).
6. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN BANKING 62 (1992).
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issuing securities can be a low-cost substitute for bank loans.
Unable to compete by offering their traditional range of services,
banks have tried to compete with non-banks by entering the
securitization business themselves. They have met with some
success, but the profit margins in this line of business are slim,
and it seems clear that the emerging financial services market-
place will not be able to support the huge industrial infrastruc-
ture that currently comprises the nation's banking system.
Thus, while securitization is good for the economy generally,
because it lowers capital costs and improves the capital alloca-
tion process, securitization is very bad for the commercial lend-
ing business - and ultimately for commercial banks - because
it results in a diminution in demand for commercial loans. 7 The
diminution in demand for bank loans has forced banks to enter
new lines of business with lower profit margins.8 Moreover, ex-
isting regulatory restrictions on the ability of banks to enter the
securities markets has made things even worse by keeping banks
out of many profitable lines of business, and by raising the costs
to banks of competing in certain areas of commerce and
finance.9
Moreover, securitization has had a profound effect on the
quality of assets held by banks. This is because the assets se-
lected for securitization are not selected randomly. Rather, fi-
nancial institutions securitize only the best assets in a bank's
portfolio, a phenomenon generally referred to as "cream-skim-
ming." In particular, economists who have studied the banking
industry recognize that bank lending requires that commercial
bankers succeed in analyzing non-standardized credit risks and
holding such credit risks in their.portfolio.'0 In particular, bor-
rowers lie on a continuum, with "information-problematic" bor-
rowers at one end, and borrowers with few information problems
at the other end."" Some borrowers have such acute information
7. See Jonathan R. Macey, Securitization, Its Effect on the Future of Banking (Nov.
21-22, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Leonard N.
Stern School of Business, Dep't of Economics) [hereinafter Macey, Securitization].
8. See Robert E. Litan, Interstate Banking and Product-Line Freedom: Would
Broader Powers Have Helped the Banks?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 521, 525 (1992).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27 (discussing the regulatory disadvantages
faced by banks).
10. See ROBERT E. LrrAN, THE REVOLUTION IN THE U.S. FINANCE (1991). See also
generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 403 (1983).
11. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Impact of Securitization on the Bank
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problems that they are unable to obtain credit from any source,
including commercial banks. Other borrowers, those at the other
end of the continuum, have few information problems. These
borrowers "issue traded securities (along with commercial paper
and medium term notes) and are monitored directly (and indi-
vidually) by the investors who purchase these securities. 12
In other words, borrowers with relatively serious informa-
tion problems constitute the clientele of commercial banks,
while borrowers with few information problems are eligible for
securitization. Thus, one characteristic of assets that are suscep-
tible to securitization is that sufficient public information about
them is available so that they can be traded in secondary mar-
kets, or at least distributed in an initial private placement or
public offering.
Put simply, banks specialize in assessing credit risk. The de-
mand for bankers' skills in evaluating particular investments has
declined as secondary, and new issue markets for securities have
developed. Geoffrey Miller and I have explained this phenome-
non in a previous article:
The traditional bank loan involves ongoing, continuous
monitoring on the part of the bank extending the credit or
making the loan. The typical loan document gives banks the
right to accelerate the maturity date of their outstanding loans.
Banks, seeking to protect their investments, carefully monitor
the firms to which they loan money on an ongoing basis. By
contrast, the process of securitization involves intense monitor-
ing by the underwriters at the time a block of securities ini-
tially is offered to the public. After the securities are sold, how-
ever, it is expected that the subsequent monitoring of the
issuer will be less intense because of the well-known collective
action and free-rider problems facing those who invested in the
issuers' securities. In particular, unlike banks, many investors
who buy securities will engage in little, if any[,] monitoring of
credit because they must incur the full costs of monitoring the
issuer, while only capturing a small portion of the gains from
such monitoring.
Those firms that cannot obtain credit unless they subject
themselves to the continual monitoring performed by banks
will continue to seek bank loans. All else being equal, borrow-
Liquidity Problem (Nov. 21-22, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New
York University Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Dep't of Economics).
12. Id.
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ing from a commercial bank will be more costly than raising
capital by issuing securities because banks must charge more
interest on loans to compensate for the continual monitoring
associated with such lending.13
Firms that can obtain credit from the securities markets will
do so in order to avoid the indirect costs of bank monitoring,
which come in the form of higher interest rates charged by
banks. Firms that do not need constant monitoring are likely to
be better credit risks than firms that need constant monitoring.
Consequently, "all else being equal, borrowers that are better
credit risks will sell securities rather than borrow from banks
because such borrowers will have no desire to pay the higher
costs of obtaining the continuous monitoring available through
commercial banks.'
14
Another reason why securitization generally is a less costly
financing vehicle than bank lending is that investors are willing
to pay a premium for liquidity. Liquidity is "a market character-
istic that assures investors that they can promptly dispose of or
purchase securities at a price reasonably related to the immedi-
ately preceding price for that security and to anticipated suc-
ceeding prices."15 Liquidity attracts investors by assuring that
securities prices will reflect the firm's true economic value,
thereby permitting relatively poorly informed investors to invest
without incurring significant information and search costs. Li-
quidity also is of value to borrowers because it permits them to
ascertain readily the cost of incurring new debt. Moreover, in-
creased liquidity lowers borrowing costs by allowing securities to
be used as collateral for loans."6
Thus, for all these reasons, it is not surprising that commer-
cial banks have made strenuous efforts to enter the securities
markets. Regulations that prevent banks from engaging fully in
securitization activities have been bad for banks for several rea-
sons. First, as mentioned above, to the extent that banks con-
tinue to make commercial loans, they have been forced to con-
centrate on increasingly risky loans as the better loans become
13. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Ori-
gins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 774 (1991) [hereinafter
Macey & Miller, America's Banking System].
14. Id.
15. Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 325.
16. See SIDNEY ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 33 (1966).
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securitized by investment banks.
Second, commercial banks have long had a competitive ad-
vantage over other firms at making commercial loans. This com-
petitive advantage stemmed both from the fact that commercial
bank officers specialized in developing close relationships with
their borrowers, and because the lending function was coupled
with the deposit-taking function. Banks' ability to observe their
customers' cash flows, as reflected in their deposit and savings
accounts, was an invaluable source of information. As borrowers
began to fund their activities by issuing securities rather than by
taking commercial loans, banks lost more than capital alone:
The problem was not simply a loss of loan revenues, although
this was bad enough. In addition, commercial banks were de-
prived of key information about the activities of their loan cus-
tomers. In the days when corporations returned to their banks
frequently to roll over commercial loans, banks were able to
maintain regular contact with their customers and thus to ob-
tain reliable, current information about them. That source of
information began to dry up as blue chip corporations increas-
ingly turned to the commercial paper market for their short-
term financing needs. 17
Third, in those aspects of the securitized world that United
States banks are permitted to enter, particularly the commercial
paper industry, competition is extremely tough. Moreover, com-
mercial banks have no competitive advantage at securitization.
Consequently, banks' market share of originations for loans that
can be securitized has been eroded dramatically.' s
Finally, securitization has been bad for banks because the
fees associated with securitizing a loan are trivial compared to
the profits involved in booking the loan as an asset. Thus, even
where baiks are able to securitize their assets, their profit mar-
gins still decline. 9 As the assets that were susceptible to moni-
toring were stripped off of banks' balance sheets and securitized,
banks were faced with the following choice: They could either
shrink by declining to replace securitized assets with new assets,
or they could replace the securitized assets with riskier, lower
17. David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank En-
try into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 369, 378 (1990).
18. Macey & Miller, America's Banking System, supra note 13, at 781.
19. Macey & Miller, America's Banking System, supra note 13, at 780.
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quality assets that were ineligible for securitization. 20 For this
reason, the benefits from securitization, which come in the form
of the fees they earn from originating, selling, and servicing the
loans that comprise the securities, are offset by "much more
powerful, and much less appreciated, negative effects on banks
B. Results of Separation
The negative impact of securitization on banking business
can be amply illustrated with examples from recent events in
the banking industry. Perhaps the most powerful illustration of
the inroads that securitization has made on the traditional prac-
tice of commercial lending is the emergence of the commercial
paper market in the United States as the primary source of
short-term financing for publicly held corporations during the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Large blue-chip corporations, which
traditionally had turned to commercial banks for their short-
term credit needs, found that they could save money by going
directly to the commercial paper market rather than obtaining
funds from banks or other financial intermediaries. Banks were
unable to compete by offering commercial loans because they
were more costly. Therefore, they were forced to try to enter the
commercial paper business directly.
Commercial banks also have attempted to lower their costs
by securitizing their assets through loan sales. Commercial
banks have become increasingly sophisticated at packaging loans
for resale. The traditional loan participation still exists, but it
has been supplemented by new inventions, particularly "loan
strips" and loan strip participations. These loan strips allow
banks to avoid the risk and regulatory costs of having loans on
their balance sheets while permitting purchasers to obtain debt
instruments with short-term maturities.2 2
A loan strip generally involves the sale by a bank of particu-
lar portions of a revolving credit agreement. Suppose, for exam-
ple, a borrower arranges for revolving credit with a particular
bank. The borrower borrows and repays money as needed during
the period in which the revolving credit agreement was in effect.
20. Macey, Securitization, supra note 7, at 4.
21. BARTH, supra note 6, at 63.
22. See generally Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1992).
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The bank determines the interest charged on the borrowing in a
variety of different ways. Sometimes the bank ties the interest
rate to the prime rate, other times to the rate at which the bank
could fund the advance by purchasing funds in the London in-
terbank market, or in the domestic Certificate of Deposit (CD)
market. Banks can then resell the loans that resulted when their
customers borrowed some of the funds available in the revolving
credit agreement. These loans often have relatively short matu-
rities, despite the fact that the, bank does not require its cus-
tomer, under the terms of the revolving credit agreement, to re-
pay the principal for some time. To make the transaction work,
commercial banks generally are committ6d to refinancing matur-
ing credit agreements on fairly liberal terms. For example, banks
do not require borrowers to make representations and warran-
ties that there was no material adverse change in their financial
condition or operations in order to receive a rollover of out-
standing advances.
These changes in the traditional loan documents created
regulatory problems for banks participating in the loan sale mar-
kets. These problems arose because regulators required banks to
treat their refinancing obligations under committed lines of
credit as borrowings for accounting purposes and ag deposits for
reserve-requirement purposes.23 However, in December 1990, the
Federal Reserve gave the sale of loan strips a considerable boost
when it eliminated reserve requirements for net Eurocurrency
liabilities and non-personal time deposits. 24
The economics of the modern market for loan participations
was succinctly summarized by Professor Marcia Stigum, who has
observed that the sale of loan participations by money center
banks "is one manifestation of their commitment to evolve out
of old-style banking into investment banking."25 The purpose of
this evolution is to permit banks to "get out of their old make-a-
loan-and-distribute-it business. '26
Professor Stigum's observation describes the attempt com-
mercial banks are making, against the tide of federal regulations,
to lower their costs and enter the modern world of finance.
Those who disapprove of universal banking and oppose the en-
23. 12 C.F.R. § 204.132 (1992); Joseph G. Haubrich, An Overview of the Market for
Loan Sales, 4 COM. LENDING REV. 39, 46 (1989).
24. 77 FED. RES. BULL. 95 (1991).
25. MARCIA STIGUM, THE MoNEY MARKET 1083 (3d ed. 1990).
26. Id.
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try by banks into the securities business are, in essence, advocat-
ing that commercial banks remain in the business of selling
buggy whips at a time when the world has turned to the automo-
bile. There is no coherent reason for barring commercial banks
from the business of dealing in securities because dealing in se-
curities is simply another means of providing funding for bor-
rowers in need of cash.
The same competitive pressures that affect bank assets also
have affected bank liabilities. On the liability side of the balance
sheet, banks attract depositors by offering them highly liquid
claims. Banks then take these resources and invest them in ex-
tremely illiquid investments. The banks ability to convert illiq-
uid investments into liquid investments is, of course, of great
value to depositors. But, as in the case of commercial lending,
the ability of banks to charge a premium for this service declines
as close substitutes emerge. Mutual funds, insurance companies,
pension funds, finance companies, and government-sponsored
enterprises all substitute for the traditional deposit-taking func-
tions of banks. It is well known that "[t]hese competitors [of
banks] have been gradually replacing depositories as individuals
have been putting a relatively smaller proportion of their savings
into depositories ....
Even securitization itself, which provides investors with the
ability to invest directly in liquid assets that provide relatively
high rates of return, is one form of substitute for bank deposits.
Barth, Brumbaugh, and Litan have observed, "Securitization
has increased the number of holders of formerly illiquid loans
held almost solely by depositories to include pension funds, in-
surance companies, mutual funds, and individuals themselves.
' 28
Of course, these new holders of securitized assets must obtain
the funds necessary to purchase these securities. In part, inves-
tors acquire these funds by liquidating their depository accounts
with banks. Thus, absent the artificial regulatory advantage of
deposit insurance, the liability side of banks' balance sheets
would be shrinking even faster than it has done already.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BANKING AND
COMMERCE
The purpose of the above discussion was to show that the
27. BARTH, supra note 6, at 61.
28. BARTH, supra note 6, at 64.
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erosion of the prohibition on bank involvement in securities
dealing has resulted both from competitive necessity and from
the economic reality that the distinction between commercial
banking and investment banking is a product of regulatory arti-
fact rather than sound public policy. The purpose of the present
discussion is to make the bolder claim that many of these same
arguments apply to the traditional distinction between banking
and commerce.
The United States government generally prohibits banks
from engaging in commercial activities, restricting banks to en-
gaging only in those activities that constitute the "business of
banking" or that are "necessary to carry on the business of
banking."29 At first blush, this distinction would seem easy to
operationalize. Clearly, there is a difference between banking
and comm ercial activities such as home building or pencil manu-
facturing. On the other hand, the difference between commercial
banking and certain other commercial activities is difficult to de-
tect. When one takes a close look at the banking industry, one
finds that information processing is critical to success. Indeed, as
Robert Litan has recognized, "all financial service firms are es-
sentially in the same business, providing and transferring infor-
mation, which suggests the presence of scope economies across
the broad range of financial services. A bank is primarily a com-
puter data base that stores information about deposits and
loans." 30
For example, banks that offer to retail stores revolving lines
of credit secured by inventory and receivables must be able to
determine the status of those receivables and inventory as
quickly and accurately as possible. Banks will take transaction
data as recorded on magnetic tape placed in cash registers to
obtain information about retailers' activities, including sales pat-
terns and payments patterns. Of course, this same information
also is of great interest to the retailers themselves. Thus, banks
have attempted to enter the business of supplying data process-
ing services to customers for a fee. 1 Under this service, banks
supply the technical expertise necessary to assemble and com-
pile reports containing a wide range of information on retailers'
businesses. Banks can also use this information in connection
29. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1992). See also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 136.
30. ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 77 (1987).
31. National Retailers Corp. of Ariz. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz.
1976), aff'd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
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with evaluating loan applications. But, retailers themselves also
could purchase the information, independent of a loan transac-
tion, thus providing the bank with income unrelated to lending
activity.
Certainly, it is possible to. limit banks' ability to engage in
this sort of commercial activity, but it would hardly be rational
to do so. For example, in National'Retailers Corp. of Arizona v.
Valley National Bank,32 which involved a successful lawsuit by
a trade group of data processors to bar commercial banks from
the business of offering data collection and processing services to
retailers, the court held that:
[I]f the reports available [from the banks' computer-based re-
tail information processing services] were limited to the
processing of applications for accounts receivable or operating
capital loans by the [defendant bank], this Court would not
hesitate to find such activity sufficiently related to the express
powers of national banks and within the standard of [the ap-
plicable precedents] .... However, the facts of this case are
otherwise. [The defendant bank] did not limit or intend to
limit [its data processing services] to producing information
and reports useful in processing and considering loan applica-
tions from persons or businesses participating in the [data
processing program] .3
This opinion, like the general, blanket legal prohibition on mix-
ing banking and commerce upon which it is based, ignores eco-
nomic reality. Banking is an industry based on information.
Banks must have the ability to access and manipulate data on
customers' accounts, loan interest rates and other pertinent in-
formation.34 Because banks must obtain accurate data to sur-
vive, to prohibit banks from using that data in as many commer-
cially viable ways as possible raises costs artificially. Such
regulations not only harm consumers by depriving them of ser-
vices at the lowest possible price, but also harm banks by raising
their costs of doing business.
Moreover, the information retrieval and data-processing
businesses are characterized by high fixed costs and low margi-
nal costs. Once a bank has made the investments in hardware,
software, and training to perform the data-processing services
32. Id.
33. Id. at 315.
34. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 156.
1993] 215
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
that it needs, it can offer the excess capacity on its system at low
cost. Since performing data-processing services is essential to
modern banking, offering excess capacity to third parties clearly
seems to be appropriate economically, if not legally.
Federal regulatory agencies also prohibit banks from pro-
viding insurance. The "turf wars" between the insurance indus-
try and the banking industry over whether banks can offer in-
surance services are legendary. The skills and technology
necessary to succeed in the insurance industry are virtually iden-
tical to the skills and technology necessary to succeed in bank-
ing. However, the insurance industry has been remarkably suc-
cessful in keeping banks out of the insurance industry,
regardless of the obvious ease and efficiency with which banks
could enter this business. This success has harmed banks enor-
mously. The rules that prohibit banks from engaging in a full
range of insurance services can only be justified on political
grounds. They cannot be justified on economic grounds.
It appears clear that, contrary to popular belief, certain
commercial activities are in fact just as closely related to bank-
ing as securities activities. Thus, just as there is no principled
basis upon which to prevent banks from entering the securities
business, there is no principled basis upon which to exclude
banks from certain aspects of commercial activity.
Current regulations have forced banks to operate inef-
ficiently and to compete in global markets at tremendous com-
petitive disadvantages. The only possible public interest justifi-
cation for placing banks at such a competitive disadvantage is to
protect them from risk. In essence, the argument is that, since
bank deposits are federally insured, the government should force
banks to accept activities restrictions in exchange for their abil-
ity to offer depositors federally insured deposits. But these ac-
tivities restrictions are an extremely ineffective device for con-
trolling risk. They do not prevent banks from engaging in even
riskier activities, like certain types of commercial and sovereign
lending. Moreover, activities restrictions also prevent banks
from obtaining the benefits of diversification, thus exposing
banks to even higher levels of risk.
IV. GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON BANKING
Perhaps reasonable people may disagree about the extent to
which the government should allow commercial banks to enter
the securities industry. And clearly there are meaningful differ-
[Vol. XIX:I
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ences between certain (though not all) types of commercial ac-
tivities and the business of commercial banking. However, the
geographic restrictions on bank expansion appear to be com-
pletely nonsensical. No one can seriously contend that the busi-
ness of banking is different in Maine than in California. None-
theless, the restrictions on intrastate expansion contained in
state law, on interstate branching contained in the McFadden
Act,35 and on bank holding company (BHC) acquisitions across
state lines contained in the Douglas Amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act (BHCA),36 continue to make geographic
expansion difficult, despite the significant inroads on these re-
strictions that have occurred in recent years.
Furthermore, the legal constraints on geographic expansion
also raise the costs of commercial banking services. Such rules
are inefficient both because they prevent banks from achieving
economies of scale and scope in their operations, and because
they prevent banks from obtaining the benefits of diversi-
fication.
It is easy to explain how banks would benefit from the di-
versification made possible through geographic expansion. Such
expansion would allow banks to expand their deposit bases as
well as their loan portfolios. Geographic expansion also would
enable banks to diversify more easily among different types of
borrowers. For example, certain types of businesses such as au-
tomobile manufacturing, chemical producing, and insurance un-
derwriting tend to be quite large. Lending limits prevent all but
the largest banks from making loans to these types of industries.
This forces small banks to focus their lending on small, usually
local, borrowers, thus excluding them from a potentially more
lucrative transaction.3 7
The cost savings to banks in the form of economies of scale
of operations is more difficult to specify. Some have argued that
geographic expansion is unnecessary because studies have not
demonstrated that economies of scale in the form of lower aver-
age costs can be obtained when banks expand. However, these
studies are unconvincing for several reasons. First, as noted
above, technological improvements often come in the form of in-
formation systems with large initial fixed capital costs followed
35. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1992).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1992).
37. LrrAN, supra note 30, at 40.
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by negligible marginal costs for additional applications. To the
extent that banks can expand geographically, they can spread
the costs of new technology across a wider array of applications.
Second, many regulatory costs, which constitute a large portion
of the cost of doing business for commercial banks, are fixed,
and therefore result in lower average costs for larger banks.
Third, as Professor Litan has observed, the studies of scale econ-
omies in banking only examine smaller banks (i.e., those with
less than one billion dollars in assets). By contrast, studies that
have looked at scale economies of large Japanese banks with
over one billion dollars in assets have found substantial econo-
mies of scale."'
Finally, and most importantly, the world of universal bank-
ing provides a useful natural experiment for those interested in
whether there are economies of scale in banking. In large indus-
trialized countries like Germany and Japan, where legal con-
straints have not impeded bank expansion, the Darwinian pro-
cess of economic competition has produced an equilibrium
condition in which large banks dominate.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The purpose of the preceding discussion has been to argue
that none of the existing restrictions on universal banking can
be defended on principled economic grounds. 39 The following
discussion explores the principal implications of that conclusion.
A. The Economics of the Politics: Prospects for Reform
The only reason that universal banking has been formally
adopted in the United States is because well-galvanized special-
interest groups have succeeded in blocking the efforts of com-
mercial banks to gain entry onto their turf. For example, the
insurance industry has, by and large, kept the banks out of the
insurance business. Similarly, the securities industry has kept
the banks out of the underwriting and trading of debt and eq-
uity for the past sixty years. The regional bankers have kept ex-
38. LITAN, supra note 30, at 40.
39. It also has been argued that banks must endure activities restrictions for anti-
trust reasons. This argument is without foundation. The antitrust laws apply to the
banking industry just as they apply to other industries. There is no reason why these
laws are not sufficient to protect the public from any dangers associated with carteliza-
tion or other monopoly behavior by banks.
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pansion-minded banks from gaining the ability to engage in in-
terstate banking. It is important to note that, contrary to
popular belief, the prospects for reform are declining rather than
improving over time, despite the recent and well-publicized ef-
forts of the Bush Administration to reduce geographic restric-
tions and to expand banks' securities powers. 0
It also should be noted that Congress defeated every aspect
of expanded powers contained in the Treasury Department's
failed reform efforts. The legislation that Congress ultimately
passed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991,41 placed banks in a significantly weaker eco-
nomic position. Not only did banks fail to receive relief from
restrictions on geographic expansion and from restrictions on
their ability to deal in securities, but Congress placed new re-
strictions on their insurance powers. Additionally, banks' operat-
ing costs dramatically increased, both as a result of new capital
requirements contained in the statut& and as a result of higher
premiums for deposit insurance.42
Public choice theory suggests a reason why banks recently
have been treated with hostility in the political arena. The pub-
lic choice model of government decision making begins with the
assumption that legal rules, including regulations promulgated
by administrative agencies, are devised to provide private goods,
in the form of wealth transfers, to powerful interest group con-
stituencies. In this context, banking law is a commodity and, like
other commodities, it is "demanded and supplied much as other
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that
derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social wel-
40. For example, section 262 of the Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer
Choice Act of 1991 (FISCCA), H.R. 1505, S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a)(1)(c)
(1991) would have amended the McFadden Act by permitting interstate branching by
national banks within three years, or at the time the state of the proposed branch had
permitted interstate banking by bank holding companies. FISCCA would have also
amended the Glass-Steagall Act to permit Financial Services Holding Companies (basi-
cally any company controlling a bank) to engage in a full range of securities activities
through a separate, authorized subsidiary. FISCCA, § 203(a)(3)(c).
41. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C.) (1991)
(FDICIA).
42. Under one provision of the FDICIA, Congress instructed the FDIC to implement
a system of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A)
(1988). Also, if a bank's capital falls below a certain level, the bank must produce a
detailed plan outlining how it would restore its capital base to a satisfactory level. 12
U.S.C. § 1831o (1988).
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However, as in economics generally, the way that one deter-
mines the value of a particular piece of legislation to a particular
group is by how much that group is willing to pay for it. This, in
turn, necessarily reflects the groups' ability to pay. Congress
uses "taxes, subsidies, regulations, and other political instru-
ments . . . to raise the welfare of more influential pressure
groups. Groups compete within the context of rules that trans-
late expenditures for political pressure into political influence
and access to political resources." 44 As I have noted in another
context, the public choice model holds that:
[P]oliticians maximize the aggregate political support they re-
ceive from all interest groups. At the margin, a legislature will
alter a rule if the resulting gain in political support from some
group outweighs any expected loss in support from a rival
group. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the public choice
model is, in fact, inconsistent with the rather primitive "cap-
ture theory" of economic regulation which posits that one par-
ticular interest group rather than a group of interest groups
drives legislation or regulation. Competition among rival pres-
sure groups with drastically differing views about what the le-
gal landscape ought to look like leads to legislative compro-
mise, not because the compromise is in the public interest, but
because it is the most effective strategy politicians have for
maximizing political support. This is because politicians can
please certain of these groups only by alienating others, and
will attempt to customize law to maximize the total support
they receive by alienating as few groups as possible. 45
The ramifications of public choice theory for the banking
industry seem clear in light of the foregoing discussion. The
banking industry is getting weaker. Other industries are becom-
ing stronger. As a consequence, the ability of the banking indus-
try to amass the economic resources necessary to succeed in the
political arena is declining.
As effective, low-cost substitutes have arisen for the core
banking services of lending and deposit-taking, other industries,-
43. Robert A. Posner, Economics,- Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
44. Gary S. Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DE-
MOCRACY, SCHUMPETER REVISITED 120, 124 (1985).
45. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 46 (1988).
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such as insurance and investment banking, have obtained access
to economic resources, which they have used effectively in the
political arena. The political cause of the banking industry has
not been helped by the fact that it often is divided in its views
on various policy issues. Regional banks are opposed to inter-
state expansion and indifferent, if not outright hostile, to the
idea of expanded securities powers. Money center banks obvi-
ously have opposing views.
Clearly, declining industries often are able to obtain politi-
cal support. In particular, as David Friedman has trenchantly
observed, where a declining industry such as steel or agriculture
has a large portion of its wealth tied up in fixed assets that are
in short supply, such as steel mills or farm land, it will benefit
even a declining industry to pay for protectionist legislation. In-
contrast, the assets devoted to the banking industry are not
fixed. Deposits and loans, and even the computers and buildings
that currently are devoted to banking, can readily be shifted to
other uses. Even the human capital skills of bankers are fairly
generic. The skills that are useful in evaluating a business for
purposes of making a commercial loan also are useful in doing
due diligence for purposes of a securities offering, or evaluating
an insurance risk.
B. Universal Banking
In the beginning of this paper, I argue that universal bank-
ing is not only desirable, it is inevitable. This assertion might
seem dubious in light of the preceding discussion, focusing as it
has on the declining political power of the banking industry.
However, if one takes seriously the arguments about the inter-
changeability of banking and other industries, it seems clear
that universal banking is fast approaching and, in fact, may al-
ready have arrived. The only problem is that, in the United
States, our universal banks are not legally known as "banks."
They are known by other names like Fidelity Investments, Mer-
rill Lynch, Ford Motor Company, and Sears, Roebuck and Com-
pany. These firms offer depository banking services in the form
of money market accounts and ownership of non-bank banks
and unitary thrifts that are perfect economic substitutes for the
depository services offered by commercial banks. Similarly,
46. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 549-50 (2d ed. 1990).
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these firms offer a full range of other services including retailing,
securities brokerage, securities underwriting, real estate broker-
age, insurance underwriting, and consumer lending.
C. Problems with the Current Model: Mandated Inefficiency
A central problem with the current regulatory system gener-
ally has gone unrecognized in the literature. This problem is not
simply that the pace of change is coming too slowly, although
that is clearly the case. The problem is not even the enormous
cost of change, in the form of lobbying costs and litigation costs,
although this too clearly is true. Rather, the problem is that
when regulatory change does occur, it inevitably occurs in ways
that place banks at an economic disadvantage vis-A-vis their ri-
val competitors who are offering the same services.
For example, after decades of litigation, which included two
Supreme Court opinions and several agency rulings and lower
court cases, 7 commercial banking organizations finally were
given the opportunity to enter the field of selling commercial pa-
per.48 Unfortunately, when permission finally came for banks to
enter this field directly, it came with such severe restrictions
that banks could not compete. Unlike investment banks that
could purchase commercial paper from issuers and then resell it
to investors in a firm-commitment underwriting, banks could
only agree to try to sell commercial paper as agents, without
purchasing for their own account any of the commercial paper it
placed.49 While this method of selling commercial paper satisfied
the statutory requirement that commercial banks sales of securi-
ties be consummated "without recourse and solely upon the or-
*der and for the account of customers,"50 it left commercial banks
at a significant competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis their invest-
ment banking rivals, who could guarantee to issuers that they
would be able to raise necessary funds by selling commercial
paper.
It is telling that those commercial banking companies that
47. For full procedural history of this very complex and drawn out litigation, see
A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd sub nom., 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 469 U.S. 137 (1984).
48. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
49. Id.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
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have gone into the commercial paper business have not done so
directly through their banks, but rather have elected to locate
their commercial paper operations in non-banking affiliates
within the holding company structure in order to avoid the regu-
latory prohibitions on bank commercial paper operations. This,
of course, denies to commercial banks the benefits of diversifica-
tion and economies of scale associated with entry into the com-
mercial paper business.
Similarly, while the government allowed banks to enter the
data-processing business, this privilege was granted only on a
heavily restricted basis that did not apply to other non-banking
firms. The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) permitted banks to
produce and process information relevant to considering and
processing loan applications, but, unlike their non-bank rivals,
banks could not put this information to its full economic use.51
Banks could not, for example, offer data-processing services to
retail firms that are not bank customers, or sell excess time on
bank data processing equipment to interested third parties, or
market by-products of its data processing activities, such as
software programs or raw data.
A clear expression of this problem facing banks can be
found in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,52 the seminal case on the
proper scope of banking powers, which involved the issue of
whether national banks could engage in the travel agency busi-
ness. In a remarkable opinion which obviously did not overly
concern itself with the financial well-being of the banking indus-
try, the court held that:
[W]hile national banks provide certain agency and informa-
tional services, they normally are of a kind which are germane
to the financial operations of the bank in the exercise of its
express powers. There are of course instances in which banks
have, as a convenience to their customers, and without addi-
tional compensation, obtained railroad, steamship or airline
tickets for such customers, or provided information helpful to
such customers in connection with their travels. But incidental
good will service of this kind cannot reasonably be equated
with the operation of a modern travel agency for profit.53
51. National Retailers Corp. of Arizona v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D.
Ariz. 1976), aff'd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 433.
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Thus, banks can conduct travel agency business, but are forbid-
den to charge for it.
Banking regulations systematically place banks at a compet-
itive disadvantage relative to their competitors at the holding
company level as well. The entry of bank holding company affili-
ates into the commercial paper business was based on the Fed's
interpretation of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.5 4 While
the Fed allowed bank holding company affiliates to dealin com-
mercial paper, it placed severe restrictions on these activities.
The Fed decided that holding company affiliates dealing in com-
mercial paper could only sell certain kinds of commercial paper
to certain types of investors and in certain minimum denomina-
tions. Affiliates could not receive more than five percent of their
revenues from such activities, and such affiliates could not ac-
count for more than five percent of the total market in dealer-
placed commercial paper.55 While the market share limitation
ultimately was struck down as having no basis in the relevant
legislation, 56 the other restrictions imposed by the Fed were up-
held.57 And, since these restrictions did not apply to organiza-
tions not affiliated with commercial banks within a holding com-
pany structure, it is safe to assume that these restrictions have
placed commercial bank affiliates at a disadvantage relative to
their competitors. Regulating fiat rather than market forces de-
termines the very mix of products sold by bank holding com-
pany securities affiliates.
One can make the same argument with respect to the nature
of geographic restrictions that prevent banks from expanding.
The Douglas Amendment to the BHCA prohibits a bank holding
company from acquiring a subsidiary bank in a different state
unless the acquired bank's state legislature specifically has au-
thorized such acquisitions.58 Until recently, state legislatures
54. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
55. 73 FED. RES. BULL. at 484 (1987).
56. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d
47, 68 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (stating that "[B]y using the
term "engaged principally" Congress indicated that its principal anxiety was over the
perceived risk to bank-solvency resulting from their over-involvement in securities activ-
ity. A market share limitation simply does not further reduce this congressional worry.").
57. The Fed's orders were upheld in three separate opinions: Securities Indus. Ass'n
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 68 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
de'nied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988); and Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988).
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bowed to the will of their state bankers and opposed bank hold-
ing companies' interstate acquisitions out of fear of takeover
threats from larger banks. However, in the early 1980s, banks
began to realize the potential benefits of interstate expansion af-
ter concluding that increased competition was inevitable and
that strong regional banking centers might be better able to
compete in national and international markets against money-
center banks. Thus, with political backing from local banks,
state legislatures began creating interstate banking compacts in
which certain states agreed reciprocally to open their interstate
banking markets to each other by lifting the Douglas Amend-
ment bar on interstate banking acquisitions.59
This development opened the door to bank expansion
through the bank holding company structure. Despite the in-
creased ability of bank holding companies to make interstate ac-
quisitions, it seems clear that regulations still make geographic
expansion through the holding company structure more costly
than expansion through branching. When banks expand through
holding company acquisitions, regulations require that the ac-
quired banks must have separate boards of directors and that
the BHC must maintain a separate corporate existence from its
subsidiary banks even if the BHC owns 100 percent of the sub-
sidiary's stock. 0 In addition, the acquired banks independently
must satisfy minimum capital requirements, must have separate
accounting and bookkeeping, and cannot take full advantage of
the reputational capital of other banks within the holding com-
pany6 1 Thus, despite the state-led liberalization of rules gov-
erning interstate acquisitions by bank holding companies, cur-
rent federal regulations and the restrictions which they impose
continue to foster inefficiency in the means by which geographic
expansion is allowed to occur.
The government has placed similar restrictions on bank
holding company affiliates' efforts to offer courier and transpor-
tation services." Banking organizations can transport data that
59. The interstate banking compact is simply an agreement among states to open
their interstate banking markets to each other. As of 1991 33 states allowed nationwide
banking by bank holding companies, with 21 states permitting entry on a reciprocal ba-
sis. The other twelve states had no restrictions. U.S. TREAS. DEP'T MODERNIZING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991).
60. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 414-15.
61. See Michigan National Corp., Order Approving Acquisition of Bank, 64 FED.
RES. BULL. 127 (1978).
62. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
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is financially related, but cannot use excess capacity to transport
other kinds of data or goods. Permitting bank holding compa-
nies engaged in the courier business to transport only financial
documents puts bank holding companies at a competitive disad-
vantage vis-a-vis courier companies that are not affiliated with
banks because a client with both financial and non-financial doc-
uments presumably will want to hire a single courier to deliver
both sorts of documents.
Likewise, in Association of Data Processing Services Orga-
nizations v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 63 when Citicorp asked the Fed for authority for its subsidi-
ary, Citishare, to engage in computer support services with
respect to processing data related to banking, finance, and eco-
nomics, the Fed decided that the data being processed must be
financial, banking, or economic, and must be marketed as such.
In addition, the Fed required that any hardware being sold must
be offered only as part of a larger package that included
software designed and marketed for the processing and trans-
mission of financial, banking, or economic data, and that such
hardware could not comprise more than thirty percent of the to-
tal cost of the package. Again, these restrictions, to the extent
they are meaningful at all, place banks at a competitive disad-
vantage relative to their competitors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The upheaval in the banking industry over the past two de-
cades has been, to a very large extent, the result of technological
change that caused banking organizations to face vigorous com-
petition from a wide variety of sources. Banks were unable to
respond to these new competitive pressures because of the laws
restricting universal banking. The ineluctable economic reality is
that universal banking is desirable to take advantage of the effi-
ciencies to be gained from combining lending and deposit-taking
with data processing, insurance, real estate, and a host of other
activities.
The outcome of the interplay between economics and polit-
ics in the banking industry is to make United States commercial
banks increasingly marginal. As commercial banking has become
less important in economic terms, it has been unable to defend
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
63. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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its political interests before Congress and administrative agen-
cies. The result has been a downward spiral in which the bank-
ing industry has become increasingly obsolete. The ultimate
irony is that as universal banking, in the form of diversified fi-
nancial services companies, gradually has emerged in the United
States, the nation's commercial banks have become ineffectual
wards of the state.

